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Abstract
The standard approach to the economics of climate change, which has its best known
implementation in Nordhaus’s DICE and RICE models (well described in Nordhaus’s 2008
book, A Question of Balance [11]) is not well equipped to deal with the possibility of catas-
trophe, since we are unable to evaluate a risk averse representative agent’s expected utility
when there is any significant probability of zero consumption. Whilst other authors attempt
to develop new tools with which to address these problems, the simple solution proposed in
this paper is to ask a question that the currently available tools of climate change economics
are capable of answering. Rather than having agents optimally choosing a path (that differs
from the recommendations of climate scientists) within models which cannot capture the
essential features of the problem, I argue that economic models should be used to determine
the savings and investment paths which implement climate targets that have been suggested
in the physical science literature.
JEL Classification: Q54, Q43, E22, H23;
Keywords: Climate Change, Catastrophe, Optimal Policy, Alternative Energy
. Investment;
1 Introduction
This article argues that there are two different questions that an economic analysis of climate
change could address when providing advice to policymakers using dynamic general equilibrium
models. These questions are: ‘What is the social cost of carbon given a climate change external-
ity? ’ and ‘Given a cumulative emissions target, what carbon tax implements this target? ’ Both
these questions are important, but in giving policy advice, we can provide a much less uncertain
answer to the second question than we can the first. The positive methodology employed in
answering these two questions is the same. The normative question is different. The standard
approach to climate change economics as pioneered by Nordhaus (see Nordhaus (2008) for a
comprehensive summary) attempts to answer the first of these questions by evaluating the price
of carbon (equal to the social cost of carbon) that a social planner would have to set, in order to
implement the policy programme that maximises their lifetime CRRA utility objective function,
in a world where high temperatures damage production or utility, and production in the absence
of abatement technology causes high temperatures.
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In section 2 of this paper, I describe the climate change policy advice that comes from the
climate-economy and climate science literatures and highlights differences between them. In
section 3, I classify economic modelling efforts according to the assumptions about catastrophe
that implicitly lie behind them, and place the physical science policy advice within this frame-
work. This classification exercise highlights the fundamental reasons for the differences in policy
recommendations that are discussed in section 2, and motivates a focus on the second question:
‘What is the carbon tax required to implement a scientifically determined target? ’. Section 4
discusses the fact that, given current knowledge, and the currently accepted welfare framework,
the only rigorous answer to the first question, ‘What is the social cost of carbon? ’, is undefined.
This section also describes some of the work that is being done on developing alternative welfare
frameworks, which will eventually allow us to answer this first question. In section 5, I sketch
a solution to the second question, and highlight the result that asking a different question can
produce qualitatively different policy advice: I present a result on the timepath of carbon taxes
that is implied by the simple model of this paper, that conflicts with many of the reported results
from standard climate economy models. Section 6 concludes.
This paper therefore both makes clear the questions that are important in climate change
economics, and provides an outline answer to the easier of the two. Despite being an easier ques-
tion, it is a less researched and possibly more policy relevant question. Given a super-abundance
of fossil fuels, and a backstop technology that is only available with large scale investment, what
carbon price path should the policymaker implement to meet a cumulative emissions target?
Questions like this have been addressed before, e.g. Nordhaus (2008) [11], talks of the applica-
tion of the DICE 2007 model to binding temperature and CO2 concentration limits; rather it is
the discussion of the prominence that such questions are given, and the implications of answering
different questions, that is the contributions of this paper.
2 Climate change policy advice
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its 2007 report [4], stated and
evidenced that there were “reasons for concern” that climate change greater than 2− 3oC may
be dangerous. This “danger” is due to the possibility that there may be thresholds in the
climate system that mean large changes, outwith the range of model predictions, are possible.
Many climate scientists are coming to the belief that avoiding thresholds, or tipping points, in the
climate system, is the crucial aspect of climate policy (see e.g. Alley et al (2003) [21], Overpeck
and Cole (2006) [2], & Lenton et al (2008) [14]). In 2005 the European Union adopted a 2oC
temperature rise limit (above pre-industrial global temperatures) as a policy goal. Given central
estimates of climate sensitivity to increases in CO2 concentrations of ∼ 3oC for a doubling of
atmospheric CO2, this implies a CO2 concentrations limit of ∼ 450ppm (given that pre-industrial
concentrations were ∼ 280ppm). However, as evidence accumulates, some have argued that the
450ppm target is too lenient, e.g. Hansen et al (2008) [25] recommend a target of, and describe
a scenario whereby, atmospheric CO2 levels are down to no more that 350ppm by 2100.
A particularly easy to express and communicate target is introduced by Allen et al (2009) [8]
who note that climate models seem relatively insensitive to the timepath of emissions, and rather
cumulative emission targets are much more useful. In keeping with the 2oC limit, they suggest
a cumulative emissions target of 1 trillion tonnnes of carbon (1TtC). Given that historical
emissions since the start of the industrial revolution are estimated at around 500 billion tonnes
of carbon (500GtC), this means we are half way through our allowance, and have 500GtC left to
burn. This is much less than the available fossil fuel resource (see Brandt & Farrell (2007) [5]).
This policy advice from the climate science community can be contrasted with that coming
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from the climate-economy literature. To summarise this, I focus on Tol (2009) [15] which suveys
prior literature. In surveying the economics of climate change field, Tol notes that an “area
of agreement between these studies is that the welfare effect of a doubling of the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gas emissions on the current economy is relatively small - a few
percentage points of GDP. ... roughly equivalent to a year’s growth in the global economy -
which suggests that over a century or so, the economic loss from climate change is not all that
large.” This summary is borne out by the fact that the climate-economy studies do not deem it
optimal to stick to a 2oC temperature rise limit. This disagreement with the recommendations
coming from the climate science community may seem strange given that many of these models
include a simplified environmental model that has been calibrated to reproduce the temperature
rises seen in climate models. For example, the DICE 2007 model described in Nordhaus (2008)
has been calibrated to the MAGICC climate model1. And the evidence for economic damages
from a given level of warming, whilst highly uncertain, has been researched (see Nordhaus (2008))
and cannot be dimissed.
The disagreement in policy recommendations, ultimately arises from the possibility of catas-
trophe - from the possibility that the actual climate response to a large increase in CO2 concen-
trations will be much greater than implied in the models. Beyond 2− 3oC ‘here be dragons’ and
explore these regions at your peril. The climate-economy models surveyed by Tol (2009) agree
with the central projections from the climate science models by construction, and it is likely that
climate damages associated with these projections are low in the context of overall global output
- but this is because no tipping points are breached, and catastrophic dynamics are not set in
motion. The calibration of the climate side of climate-economy models to the central projection
from models used in climate science, whilst clearly constraining the policy recommendations
from the climate-economy literature, is not capturing the state of scientific knowledge of climate
change. Climate science models have difficulty in matching some features of the known paleocli-
mate record, and of matching the tipping-point, threshold behaviour, suggested by paleoclimatic
data (see Valdes (2011) [18]). The central IPCC climate projections contain no threshold effects
at a 2oC temperature rise and the accompanying warning of “reasons for concern” that climate
change greater than 2− 3oC may be dangerous, is due to the sense that climate science practi-
tioners have that the models’ central projections cannot be trusted for large climate forcings -
largely because of this failure to match the paleoclimate record.
In addition to the treatment of catastrophe causing a problem in deriving an optimal policy in
climate-economy studies (discussed further in the next section), there is a further problem with
surveying the social cost of carbon (or equivalently the optimal carbon tax) across the economics
of climate change literature and producing mean or median estimates that may be regarded as the
considered view of the economics profession. Many articles make a methodological contribution
or add some new feature to the climate-economy models. Their social cost estimate should
therefore not be viewed as a data point towards what the economics profession think the optimal
carbon price is, but rather as determining the marginal value of this new feature on the optimal
carbon tax. For example, Lemoine & Traeger (2012) [16], and Brock et al (2012) [24] describe
climate economy models with a non-catastrophic “tipping point” and so their contribution can
be viewed as estimating the marginal value of this feature. Golosov et al (2011) [17] derive, under
certain assumptions, a closed form optimal tax formulation that depends only on the parameters
of the model rather than knowledge of the future evolution of the model’s endogenous variables,
and so contribute to the climate change economist’s toolbox rather than providing a data point
for a survey.
Golosov et al (2011) also report that carbon taxes should fall over time and that constant
1Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change. See
http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/
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taxes have no effect on usage. This conclusion is due to Inada conditions on the use of energy
together with no available alternative energy technologies - which are modelling simplification
devices included to enable the study to addess the question of ‘What is the optimal carbon tax
given a climate change externality? ’. Given the Allen et al (2009) conclusion that cumulative
emissions are what matters and that some fossil fuels should be left in the ground, making these
assumptions mean that the conclusions are not capable of being consistent with the climate
science advice. By asking a different question, ‘Given a cumulative emissions target, what carbon
tax implements this target? ’, the model I present in Section 5 reaches a different conclusion on
the time path of carbon taxes. If we ask different questions we get different answers.
3 Classifying approaches to climate change economics
I classify climate-economy studies into 4 groups depending on whether there is or is not a tipping
point, whether avoiding crossing this tipping point on a CO2 stabilisation path is technologically
feasible, and whether crossing the tipping point is catastrophic or not. Before describing this clas-
sification, I shall first outline exactly what I mean by a tipping point and discuss some evidence
that means that we cannot rule out tipping points being catastrophic for global civilisation.
A tipping point is a feature of dynamical systems with multiple steady states. As some forcing
(like CO2 from human emissions, or insolation (a measure of solar energy received on the Earth’s
surface)) is applied to a system (like the Earth’s climate), the equilibrium state of the system
may change smoothly, or it may change discontinuously across a tipping point. Reversing the
forcing change need not reverse the movement across the tipping point. For example Zaliapin
and Ghil (2010) [6] present a simple energy balance model of an water-world Earth-like system
that is vulnerable to a catastrophic cooling to a snowball Earth state. The mechanism for
this is that ice is much more reflective than water and so a world with intermediate levels of
incoming solar radiation can be either cold or hot. If cold then the planet is ice-covered and heat
reflecting (high albedo) which induces energy balance at a cold temperature, if warm then the
planet is water-covered and heat absorbing (low albedo) which induces energy balance at a warm
temperature i.e. two steady states. Suppose the system is in the cold, ice-covered steady state,
then in order to transition to the warm steady state, incoming solar radiation has to be raised to
a very high level to the point where ice cannot exist, at which point the cold steady state cannot
exist and temperatures rise catastrophically as we cross the tipping point. The situation is well
described by the bifurcation diagram, figure 1, taken from Zaliapin and Ghil (2010) which shows
the equilibrium insolation and temperature combinations in their model.
4
(red, dashed line) and absorbed in-
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Fractional insolation change, µ
T
e
m
p
e
r a
t u
r e
,  
T
current Earth state 
Fig. 5. Equilibrium solutions of the EBM (15) depending on theFigure 1: Energy Balance model of Snowball Earth from [6]
There are multiple sources of possible tipping points in the real Earth system including:
• The loss of polar ice at higher temperatures leading to a loss of albedo and a further rise
in temperatures;
• Higher temperatures reducing ocean turnover, which reduces ocean productivity and carbon
absorbtion and storage, causing a further rise in temperatures;
• Higher temperatures drying out peat bogs at high latitudes, melting methane hydrates
in ocean sediments, and burning tropical forests, all causing carbon emissions from the
natural environment, and hence a further rise in temperatures.
Each of these could lead to tipping points as the Earth transitions from one steady state to
another. And once we hit a tipping point, change can be very fast: we have evidence (Alley
(1993) [1]) that there were changes (at least at the regional, if not the global, level) of as much
as 10oC in as little as a decade, as Earth was coming out of the last ice age. Given our industrial
society and economy, such rapid change could be very destabilising and damaging.
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Figure 2: Approximate paleoclimate history, taken from http://www.scotese.com/climate.htm,
created by Prof C Scotese, University of Texas at Arlington, Dept. Earth & Environmental
Sciences
The geological record of global temperatures is suggestive of multiple steady states (see Figure
2). Futher, there is evidence that the majority of the mass extinctions in the fossil record are
associated with greenhouse warming events (see Ward (2006) [22] for a summary). It therefore
seems clear that it is certainly possible that mechanisms exist such that sudden drastic warming
is caused as a tipping point is passed, and that the impact of this warming is catastrophic -
possibly enough to cause civilisational collapse or even human extinction. This may not be the
central expectation, but many physical scientists are warning that catastrophe is possible: see
Hansen (2009) [7] for a comprehensive account of the fears of one prominent climate scientist
who clearly believes that human caused greenhouse gas emssions could lead to an extinction level
catastrophe.
The 4 groups in the climate-economy study classification are described below. The charts
accompanying these classifications have been created with the simple climate-economy model
with tipping point outlined in the Appendix.
1. No tipping point: damages, however severe, are a smooth function of stabilisation CO2
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concentrations, and are never catastrophic. This is the case considered by Nordhaus (2008),
Golosov et al (2011), and in the underlying papers of the Tol (2009) survey.
2. A non-catastrophic tipping point. The optimum may be before, at, or after the tipping
point, and stabilisation before may or may not be feasible. This is the case that Brock et
al (2012) and Lemoine & Traeger (2012) model. Figures 3 and 4 illustrates the cases with
feasible stabilisation before the tipping point, and with optima at and after the tipping
point.
Figure 3: Utility & Marginal Utility with a non-catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation at the
tipping point is optimal
7
Figure 4: Utility & Marginal Utility with a non-catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation after
the tipping point is optimal
3. There is a case where we cannot afford to stabilise before the tipping point (since the costs
of doing this are greater than output in the policy period), but crossing the tipping point is
catastrophic and corresponds to some civilisational collapse or extinction event as discussed
above. This maximisation problem has no solution. Considering this to be one possible
outcome in an ex-ante unknown problem, then any significant probability attached to this
event will cause the optimisation under uncertainty to have no solution. This essentially
is the case described in Weitzman (2009)’s Dismal Theorem [23]: whatever the level of
unaffordable stabilisation costs, there is some small but non-zero probability (fat-tailed
density) that a catastrophe occurs before this stabilisation level.
4. A catastrophic tipping point, but stabilisation before this tipping point is possible. There
is infinite marginal benefit of climate policy implementation at the tipping point. Figures
5 and 6 illustrates this. This is the scenario that the climate science community is warning
about: we cannot rule out tipping points being catastrophic, but it is likely that we can do
something about the problem if we act quickly and decisively to implement climate policy.
Stabilisation at or before the tipping point is optimal. Given uncertainty about exactly
where the tipping point is, stabilisation exactly at the tipping point will be impossible.
Assuming scientific advice to be erring on the cautionary side, following scientific advice is
stabilisation before the tipping point. This is a realistic policy scenario.
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Figure 5: Utility & Marginal Utility with a catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation at the
tipping point is optimal
Figure 6: Utility & Marginal Utility with a catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation before the
tipping point is optimal
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Given this classification, we can see clearly where the divergence in policy advice between
those arguing within the paradigm of case 4 (climate science recommendations), and those ar-
guing within the paradigm of case 1 (the majority of climate change economics), comes from.
However, this classification also reveals that the work of Brock et al (2012) and Lemoine &
Traeger (2012), (case 2), does not help in bridging this divide: it may be optimal to stabilise at
a point after a non-catastrophic tipping point, and Brock et al (2012) and Lemoine & Traeger
(2012) merely discuss particulars of such models. The existence of non-catastrophic tipping
points does affect optimising behaviour in ways related to the system dynamics and the degree
of risk aversion of the agents, however these models do not help us at all in determining where the
tipping points are, our how damaging they will be. Given that we cannot rule out catastrophic
damages (and indeed suspect that they may exist), then unless we change the welfare framework
(discussed in Section 4), we are, at least in a probabilistic sense, in case 3 (cue tearing of hair and
gnashing of teeth, we’re all doomed!) or case 4 (sensible but urgent policy advice). Stabilisation
before any tipping point is likely (though not certainly) feasible and optimal. Climate models,
being detailed models of the climate, are more appropriate than any climate-economy models
(which necessarily have more approximation in order to facilitate optimisation) for determining
where the tipping points are. These climate models have not answered this question yet, so the
best we, as economists, can do is to trust what practitioners in this field say and recommend.
For the economics of climate change, as Pindyck (2012) [13] says “it seems to me that a very
detailed and complex modeling exercise is unlikely to be helpful”, we should let the climate
science community do the heavy modelling work, take their recommendations, and concentrate
on modelling the economic impacts and determining the economic instruments that implement
policy.
4 Dealing with the First Question
Nordhaus’s standard approach to climate change economics, which (as discussed) is an effort to
answer the ‘What is the social cost of carbon? ’ question, was extensively criticised by Weitzman
in a series of papers (see principally Weitzman (2009)) in which he shows that, allowing for
uncertainty, this carbon price is infinite. Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem applies to problems which
use an objective function with infinite marginal utility of consumption at the zero consumption
level, combined with an effective probability mass2 attached to catastrophe, which equates to
this zero consumption level.
It is easy to to object to this conclusion, which implies that society would optimally allocate
an arbitrarily high share of current output to preventing tiny but non-zero risks of catastrophe or
extinction. And while we may believe that society should devote more resources to climate change
mitigation (or to developing asteroid or super-volcano protection systems etc) than it currently
does, we are unlikely to believe that the resources so allocated should be approximately 100% of
current output. However, on what grounds do we object to Weitzman’s theorem? Which of the
underlying assumptions do we disagree with?
According to Millner (2012) [9], there are three bottom-up grounds to object to Weitzman’s
methods and, therefore, conclusions: is it reasonable to attach a probability mass point to the
possibility of catastrophe; is the assumption of infinite marginal utility of consumption at a zero
consumption level reasonable; and, is this analysis under uncertainty relevant to a Cost Benefit
Analysis (CBA) of climate policy? Millner concludes that only the infinite marginal utility of
2Weitzman’s result is stronger than this in that it actually just relies on fat tails, either in the distribution
of environmental outcomes or in the distribution of economic damages associated with a particular level of
environmental outcome. Describing this result as applying due to a probability mass on catastrophic outcomes is
intuitive though.
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consumption critique has validity. Therefore, in order to evaluate the social cost of carbon
we need to study how to (finitely) value catastrophe risks i.e. risks to civilisation or risks of
extinction.
Weitzman (2009) discusses doing this by truncating the valuation attached to bad events,
using a Value of Statistical Life (VSL) method. However this approach is shown to generate
results in which the truncation becomes the dominant factor in the CBA calculation (so the size
of the median impact does not really effect the calculation, the impact comes almost entirely
from the choice of truncation methodology). Ikefuji et al (2011) [10] describe a stochastic climate
economy model with non CRRA utility specifications chosen to produce robust policy prescrip-
tions. This is an attempt to deduce a welfare framework on decision making under uncertainty
about catastrophe from the axiom that ex-ante policy is both optimal and reasonable (i.e. not
100% of output). Millner (2012) is also a discussion the development of a welfare framework in
which it is sensible to ask how we should value civilisation preserving policies, and which does
not run into the Dismal Theorem’s paradoxical infinities. This question is an interesting and
important research question, but it is also a hard problem, and in the meantime, what advice do
we give to policymakers on optimal climate change policy?
The answer proposed in this paper is to change the question: if we assume that following
the advice of the climate science community eliminates the risk of catastrophe, then we could
use a CRRA utility specification that exhibits infinite marginal utility at zero consumption,
since we would only be using this welfare framework in its natural setting i.e. for consumption-
savings decisions well away from the zero consumption level. We cannot strictly make this
assumption, therefore we are not asking ‘what is the optimal policy?’, rather we are imposing
scientific advice as a resource constraint and asking what price implements this constraint. The
normative question is different - but still policy relevant and can be reconciled with the views of
the climate science community.
5 Sketching a solution to the Second Question
In this section, I set out to answer the second question that practitioners within the economics
of climate change should be addressing: ‘Given a cumulative emissions target, what carbon tax
implements this target? ’. I base the model I use to answer this question, to a limited extent, on
Golosov et al (2011), not because I intend to argue with this paper in particular, but because it
is a recent paper with a clear calibration that I can use. However, the main purpose of showing
this exercise, as well as highlighting those features that should be included within such a model
(and which are often not included in climate-economy models that attempt to answer the first
question), is that Golosov et al (2011) makes a strong claim about the time paths of carbon taxes
which this answer to the second question does not support. This highlights the fact that asking
different questions can produce different answers!
Golosov et al (2011) is a standard, smooth damages, climate economy general equilibrium
model that has a number of interesting features, but whose main contribution is the derivation,
under certain assumptions, of a closed form optimal tax formulation that depends only on the
parameters of the model rather than knowledge of the future evolution of the model’s endogenous
variables. The optimum level of carbon emissions in their results is much greater than the
500GtC future cumulative emissions limit that Allen et al (2009) recommend. Their optimal
policy is determined by balancing the marginal costs of climate change against marginal benefits
of energy use (non carbon energy sources are not available in their model until after the model’s
time horizon of more than a century). Their model does not consider the development of, and
investment in, the alternative energy technologies needed for the post fossil fuel world. The
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focus therefore of the Golosov et al (2011) model (in common with most such models) is on
the environmental side which, as previously argued, climate economy models are poorly equiped
to deal with, and not at all on the investment side which economic models have comparative
advantage in addressing.
I develop a simple two energy sector economy model with an available stock of carbon energy
resources, and also the technological possibility of building non carbon energy infrastructure. The
model is calibrated so that the social planner, faced with a resource constraint of using only those
resources used in the Golosov et al (2011) optimum, sets a carbon tax equal to that derived in the
initial period of Golosov et al (2011) i.e. $56.9/tC. Using this calibration, I can then estimate
the carbon tax needed to implement a resource restriction consistent with Allen et al (2009).
Climate damages do not enter the model: if we were to include climate damages that were
very low before the tipping point but infinite after it, instead of implementing this via a resource
constraint, then the results would not be much altered. The details of the model and the solution
algorithm are outlined in Appendix 2, but broadly the social planner has logarithmic preferences
over consumption, energy is essential for production and energy itself can be produced from some
stock S0 of fossil fuel or from some green-tech energy capital stock. The social planner’s problem
is to maximum lifetime utility by choosing consumption, investment in capital, and investment
in green-tech energy capital, subject to the available fossil fuel energy resources.
We can determine the social planner’s optimum solution to the saving and investment problem
given various different values for S0. The path for marginal product of energy gives the path for
prices that the final goods sector pays the fossil fuel sector for its energy supply. There is some
true value for S0 (i.e. the S0 that pertains in a laissez-faire world). A carbon tax can be applied
in this world so that the total payment made by the final goods sector is the corresponding
marginal product from the restricted S0 world, and the payment received by the fossil fuel sector
(marginal product of energy less carbon tax) equalises the rate of return for the represenative
fossil fuel supplier, between supplying fuels and leaving them in the ground where their value
can appreciate or depreciate. At time T the energy sector is entirely decarbonised and for all
times t > T the carbon tax must be (greater than or) equal to the marginal product of energy
so that the final goods sector’s net payment to the fossil fuel industry is zero. The value of the
remaining fossil fuel resources at this point is also zero (though the marginal value of increasing
the amount of fossil fuels that we are willing to burn is most definitely not zero). We can therefore
implement a restriction on the total allowable burnable fossil resource even in the presence of a
super-abundance. We proceed as follows (again full details in Appendix 2):
• Assume the calibration of Golosov et al (2011) and calibrate production function so that
current global capital stock and energy usage produces current global GDP.
• Use the Golosov et al (2011) carbon budget (substantially greater than 500GtC) under
their optimum policy as a resource constraint, and use their initial carbon tax of $56.9/tC
as a further calibration target to fully calibrate the model. We label the model run with
S0 ≡ Golosov et al (2011) carbon budget as “Calibration” in Figures 7, 8 & 9.
• The policy we cost here, from Allen et al (2009), is restricting S0 to 500GtC, to get the
1TtC cumulative emissions. This model run is labelled as “1TtC” in Figures 7, 8 & 9.
• The required carbon tax in the 1TtC policy scenario is found to be $94.0/tC at the outset.
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Figure 7: Fossil fuel use, in 1GtC, vs time
Figure 8: Carbon taxes, in $/tC, vs time
Figure 9: Investment in alternative energy capital, as % of GDP , vs time
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As well as reporting a higher tax needed to implement an emissions target that we already
know to be tighter than the optimum reported in Golosov et al (2011) (not a surprising result),
it is also interesting to report the time path of taxes. In common with much of the economics of
climate change literature, it is asserted in Golosov et al (2011) that “A constant value-added tax
does not affect the intertemporal decisions of the firm, and hence has no effect on allocations,
no matter how high this tax is.” This is true only in a model in which there is no alternative
energy supply (which does not pay the tax) and in which policy is to manage the time profile
of emissions rather than the cumulative total of emissions. In a world where we are relatively
energy constrained in the no-fossil fuels future compared with today, the ultimate carbon tax will
be fairly high (because the marginal product of energy will be high). Initially there is relative
energy abundance and the marginal product of energy (which is the price that the final goods
sector pays for its energy), is lower than it will be in long run steady state (which relies entirely
on the backstop technology). We want to allow some fossil fuel use in this early period to fund
the transition to the backstop technology i.e. we want a carbon tax that is less than a low
energy price, rising over time so that at the point at which we have made the transition, the
carbon tax is equal to the higher steady state energy price. The carbon price is rising in the
result generated here, however, so long as the ultimate carbon price is greater than or equal to
the marginal product of renewable energy in steady state then this is a carbon tax that will
eliminate fossil emissions leaving remaining resources in the ground. On the way to this level the
tax can be high and falling (extremely stringent climate policy), constant, or low and rising (less
stringent climate policy). The level of long run renewable energy output is a key determinant of
this steady state carbon tax level.
The energy transition model as sketched out in this section has been contrasted throughout
against the climate economy model of Golosov et al (2011). This comparison was for rhetorical
effect in order to make a point about the policy conclusions that we can draw from such models
in giving advice to policymakers. To fully answer the question of what is the optimal carbon
price to implement a cumulative emissions target, we should include a more complete model
of the energy sector. Such a model would include features such as fossil fuel extraction costs,
inelastic demand for energy, and technological progress. A full study would build upon the work
of e.g. Hassler et al (2011) [12] who provide evidence that energy saving technical progress does
respond to the energy price, and that the elasticity of substitution between energy and other
factors of production is substantially less than 1; and David & van Zon (2012) [19] which is an
example of a transition model which incorporates endogenous growth. I believe the study of the
transformation and decarbonisation of the energy sector (and the interaction that this transition
with the rest of the economy) is the central question of climate change economics, rather than
the trade off between climate damages and the benefit flow from emitting carbon.
6 Conclusion
This article has argued that the reason for the dichotomy in policy advice between the climate
science and economics literatures is fundamentally due to the treatment of catastrophic outcomes.
To proceed, we can:
1. ignore the possibility of catastrophe, as much of the economics literature has done, and
make policy recommendations that are far too light;
2. allow for catastrophe within our current welfare framework and recommend that we devote
100% of output to climate change mitigation (and another 100% of output to prevent other
unlikely catastrophes!);
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3. develop a new welfare framework in which we can sensibly evaluate policies that payoff
only in preventing civilsational collapse or human extinction, and in the meantime, try not
to muddy the waters with our half formed views of what appropriate policy is for climate
change mitigation;
4. take the cumulative emissions limits, given to us by the climate science community, as
resource constraints, and evaluate optimal policy conditional on staying within these con-
straints. The only way for the answer to this question to also be the answer to the“what
is the optimal policy” question, is for scientists to be able to guarantee that following their
advice would prevent catastrophe. Of course no such guarantees can be offered.
Whilst both options 3 and 4 above are sensible, this article is an appeal for more efforts to
be put into 4. The minimal features that a model which can address 4 must exhibit are an
alternative energy infrastructure technology and an ability for agents to leave resources in the
ground. Such models could be used to provide highly relevant input that could inform the debate
as to optimal climate change mitigation strategies.
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Appendix 1
The very simple climate-economy model presented in this appendix is used to generate the utility
and marginal utility charts in Section 3. The tipping point is generated with a methane hydrate
reservoir of size M¯ with an emission process given by:
M˙t = −max [0, Tt − T ∗M ]Mt
Mt ∈ [0, M¯ ]
Where T ∗M is the destabilisation temperature for the methane hydrate stocks. There are two
possible stable states for this system:
• If human emissions cause a temperature rise of less than T ∗M then methane hydrate stocks
are not destabilised and ultimate CO2 levels are just given by pre-industrial levels and
those human emissions that remain in the atmosphere.
• If human emissions cause a temperature rise of more than T ∗M then methane hydrate
stocks are destabilised and ultimate CO2 levels are given by pre-industrial levels, remaining
atmospheric human emissions and M¯ .
Figure 10 illustrates this model given a particular parameter set. It shows equilibrium CO2 levels
against pre-industrial plus remaining atmospheric human emissions, generated using a logarith-
mic relationship between temperature change and CO2 increases with a climate sensitivity of
3oC for a doubling of CO2
3, T ∗M = 3
oC (above pre-industrial temperatures), and M¯ = 500ppm
(which is assumed either to all remain in the atmosphere or to be the remaining atmospheric
amount from the methane hydrate reservior).
Figure 10: Simple Tipping Point Model with Methane Hydrates
Using this model (though not necessarily the above parameterisation), we can impose a
modified version of the climate damages function from Golosov et al (2011)4. The Golosov et al
3This fixes the climate sensitivity parameter, κ = (3oC)/ ln (2)
4Which was calibrated to reproduce the damages from the DICE 2007 model described in Nordhaus (2008)
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(2011) damage function is D(S) = 1 − exp (−γ(S − S¯)), with S¯ = 280ppm being pre-industrial
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and D expressed as the percentage of output lost due to high
temperatures. This specification is modified to allow for the possibility that the tipping point is
catastrophic i.e. in some circumstances we set D(S > Stp) = 100%. Economic output is assumed
to be constant and entirely consumed, except in the first period when some some is spent on
climate policy, such that costs are hyperbolic in the stabilisation level. Utility is assumed to
be CRRA, and climate policy is undertaken in the first period to achieve some stabilisation
level of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. This first period is assumed to be long enough to fully
implement emissions elimination at some stabilised level of atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and
for the climate system to reach equilibrium. Utility as a function of the target CO2 stabilisation
level (S, expressed in ppm CO2), and the other equations of this simple model are:
U(S) =
(Y − C(S))1−θ − 1
1− θ +
∞∑
t=1
(Y (1−D(S)))1−θ − 1
1− θ
( 1
1 + r
)t
where, C(S) =
A
S − 394 , S > 394
D(S) =
{
DNC(Sult(S)) if the tipping point is not catastrophic,
DCat(Sult(S)) if the tipping point is catastrophic.
DNC(Sult(S)) = 1− exp (−γ(Sult(S)− S¯))
DCat(Sult(S)) =
 DNC(Sult(S)) if κ ln
(
S
280
)
< T ∗M ,
100% if κ ln
(
S
280
)
> T ∗M .
and, Sult(S) =
 S if κ ln
(
S
280
)
< T ∗M ,
S + M¯ if κ ln
(
S
280
)
> T ∗M .
We can represent the utility maximisation problem as a comparison between the marginal
costs of implementing climate policy and the marginal benefits of implementing climate policy.
Targetting CO2 stabilisation at the tipping point Stp (defined by T (Stp) = T
∗
M ) is always (at
least a one sided local) utility maximum and at this point there is a singularity in the marginal
benefit of implementing climate policy.
19
Appendix 2
Details and solution methods of the model used in Section 5. Variable definitions:
Yt ≡ Output
Ct ≡ Consumption
L ≡ Population (assumed constant)
Et ≡ Energy
Rt ≡ Renewable energy infrastructure
Ft ≡ Fossil fuels used
Kt ≡ Other physical capital
St ≡ Stocks of fossil fuels
It ≡ Investment in renewable energy infrastructure
0 < α < 1 ≡ Capital share of total income
0 < ν < 1 ≡ Energy share of total income
0 < γ < 1 ≡ Returns to scale in renewable energy production
0 < β < 1 ≡ Discount Factor
0 < δ < 1 ≡ Depreciation rate (of both R & K)
A′ ≡ Total factor productivity (assumed constant)
A = A′L1−α−ν
B ≡ Renewable energy infrastructure productivity (assumed constant)
Technologies and resource constraints:
Yt = A
′L1−α−νKαt E
ν
t = AK
α
t E
ν
t
Et = Ft +BR
γ
t
Rt+1 = Rt(1− δ) + It
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ) +AKαt (Ft +BRγt )ν − Ct − It
St+1 = St − Ft
Ft ≤ St , ∀t
Preferences - use log utility, so that the value function:
Vt(Kt, Rt, St) = logCt + βVt+1(Kt+1, Rt+1, St+1)
First Order Conditions:
w.r.t. Ct, β
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
=
1
Ct
w.r.t. It,
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
=
∂Vt+1
∂Rt+1
w.r.t. Ft, µt = βνAK
α
t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν−1 ∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
− β ∂Vt+1
∂St+1
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Envelope Theorem Conditions:
w.r.t. Kt,
∂Vt
∂Kt
= β(1 + αAKα−1t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν − δ) ∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
w.r.t. Rt,
∂Vt
∂Rt
= βνγABRγ−1t K
α
t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν−1 ∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
+ β(1− δ) ∂Vt+1
∂Rt+1
w.r.t. St,
∂Vt
∂St
= β
∂Vt+1
∂St+1
+ max (µt, 0)
such that:
Ft < St ⇒ µt = 0
Ft = St ⇒ µt > 0
Eliminate marginal values to derive difference equations to characterise the system. 6 equations in
6 unknowns, Kt, Rt, St, Ct, Ft, µt. We know K0, R0, S0. We shall need to construct an algorithm
to determine C0, F0 ≤ S0. Then (assuming F0 < S0) for times 1 ≤ t < T :
St = St−1 − Ft−1
Kt +Rt = (Kt−1 +Rt−1)(1− δ) +AKαt−1(Ft−1 +BRγt−1)ν − Ct−1
Ct = Ct−1β(1 + αAKα−1t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν − δ)
α
Kt
=
νγBRγ−1t
Ft +BR
γ
t
µt = 0( Kt
Kt−1
)α( Ft +BRγt
Ft−1 +BR
γ
t−1
)ν−1
= 1 + αAKα−1t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν − δ
Time T is defined as the point, t, at which the first system above generates Ft > St. From t ≥ T
the system is specified by:
Ft = St
St = St−1 − Ft−1
Kt +Rt = (Kt−1 +Rt−1)(1− δ) +AKαt−1(Ft−1 +BRγt−1)ν − Ct−1
Ct = Ct−1β(1 + αAKα−1t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν − δ)
α
Kt
=
νγBRγ−1t
Ft +BR
γ
t
µt = νA
(
Kαt (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν−1 1
Ct
− βKαt+1(Ft+1 +BRγt+1)ν−1
1
Ct+1
)
The time t value of each asset Kt, Rt, St is:
∂Vt
∂Kt
= (1 + αAKα−1t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν − δ) 1
Ct
∂Vt
∂Rt
= (1 + νγABRγ−1t K
α
t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν−1 − δ) 1
Ct
∂Vt
∂St
= νAKαt (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν−1 1
Ct
Therefore we calculate the total return on each asset over period (t, t + 1). By a no arbitrage
argument these total returns should all be the same, and since there is no uncertainty, their value
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should be 1/β.
TR(Kt) =
[
(1− δ) ∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
+
αAKα−1t (Ft +BR
γ
t )
ν
βCt
]/ ∂Vt
∂Kt
TR(Rt) =
[
(1− δ) ∂Vt+1
∂Rt+1
+
νγABRγ−1t K
α
t (ft +BR
γ
t )
ν−1
βCt
]/ ∂Vt
∂Rt
TR(St) =
∂Vt+1
∂St+1
/∂Vt
∂St
Steady state can be calculated:
S∗ = 0
F ∗ = 0
K∗ =
(αABν(γν/α)γν
1/β + δ − 1
) 1
1−α−γν
R∗ =
γν
α
K∗
C∗ = ABν(K∗)α(R∗)γν − δ(K∗ +R∗)
µ∗ =
νABν−1(K∗)α(R∗)γ(ν−1)(1− β)
C∗
E∗ = B(R∗)γ
The algorithm to determine C0, F0 ≤ S0
• Given F0, adjust C0 so that Ct is arbitrarily close to C∗ at some suitably large t (i.e use
the forward shooting method)
• If the total return on fossil fuels over the final period of their use is too high then they are
in too short supply and should be conserved at the outset i.e. F0 is too high and should
be lowered. Vice versa for total returns that are too low.
We proceed as follows (full details):
• Assume the calibration of Golosov et al (2011) i.e. α = 0.3, ν = 0.03, β = 0.985 (per
annum), δ = 1. Time step = 10 years. Therefore still have 3 unknown parameters: A,B,
& γ.
• Estimate initial global capital stock, K0 + R05. Take the percentage of global primary
energy supply from fossil fuels from data (∼ 80%) and combine with initial carbon usage
from the laissez-faire version of Golosov et al (2011), 128GtC, so that E0 = 128/80%
and such that the production function produces current global GDP, Y0. Assume that
E0 = 2E
∗ i.e. we assume that a future world which uses non-fossil energy resources will
be more energy constrained than our current world (this may or may not be a reasonable
assumption, and it is important for the timepath of carbon taxes discussed below). For a
given choice of γ these assumptions give us A & B, i.e. using these 2 relationships, we can
fix 2 of the 3 unknown parameters.
• Following Golosov et al (2011) let S0 = 1400 in laissez-faire (400GtC from oil and 5000GtC
from coal which has an efficiency of 0.2 and convert to energy units (1GtC of oil gives 1
51990 estimate of global capital stock taken from [3], rolled up to 2011 using Gross World Product from
Wikipedia
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energy unit) rather than units of carbon). The Golosov et al (2011) optimum uses 691
energy units of fossil fuel and is implemented using an initial carbon tax of $56.9/tC. We
choose γ to match this initial tax rate i.e. this further relationship pins down the remaining
unknown parameter. This model run is labelled as “Calibration” in Figures 7, 8 & 9.
• The policy we cost here, from Allen et al (2009), is restricting S0 to 420 energy units
(400GtC of oil and 100GtC from coal at 0.2 efficiency, to get the 1TtC cumulative emis-
sions)6. This model run is labelled as “1TtC” in Figures 7, 8 & 9.
• The required carbon tax in the 1TtC policy scenario is found to be $94.0/tC at the outset.
Figure 11: Fossil fuel use, in energy units such that 1EU is provided by 1GtC of oil or 5GtC
of coal, vs time. The caption on Figure 7 in the main body of the text does not describe this
complication.
6The model actually produces fossil energy taxes applied to energy units and does not differentiate between
oil and coal. This is not too inappropriate for the 1TtC run since coal is not much used, it is less appropriate the
more coal that is in the mix.
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